The Economic Effects of Reallocating Publicly Owned Hydropower in New York State by Hertel, Thomas W. & Mount, Timothy D.
April 1984 A.E. Res. 8 4 -7
!im iS;NM Km <4 AGRICULTURE
The Economic Effects of 
Reallocating Publicly Owned Hydropower
in New York State
by
Thomas W. Hertel 
and
Timothy D. M o u n t*
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Cornell University Agricultural Experiment Station 
Hew York State College of Agriculture ond Life Sciences 
A  Statutory College of the State U n iw iit y  
Cornell University, Ithaca, New York 14853
It is the policy of Cornell University actively to support equality 
of educational and employment opportunity. No person shall be 
denied admission to any educational program or activity or be 
denied employment on the basis of any legally prohibited dis­
crimination involving, but not limited to, such factors as race, 
color, creed, religion, national or ethnic origin, sex, age or 
handicap. The University is committed to the maintenance of 
affirmative action programs which will assure the continuation 
of such equality of opportunity.
I. INTRODUCTION
t  ^ Tl,iv 1 oq 1 reoort to the Governor and the State Legislature, 
the Chairman of the Power Authority of the State of New York (PASNY) 
proposed a substantial reallocation of cheap, state-omed hydropower 
among residents of the state. Referring to the curren inequi-
hydroelectricity, PASNY Chairman John Dyson asserts that. - ?
table treatment of citizens by a State agency . . . ln ° ’
intolerable in a democratic society." For purposes of illustration, 
Dyson (1981) notes that the cost of 700 kwh of electricity m  
burgh is $ 11, as opposed to $86 in White Plains His proposal 
allocating hydropower benefits involved the establishment of a Resi­
dential and Rural Energy Authority which would distribute ^  i n e x p ^  
sive hydropower remaining after trial committments
«“ L.“ s . V t o  anTstim'ated 100,000 jobs in Upstate New
York, the existence of which is purported by PASNY to be attributable to
historically cheap power,)
The hydropower facilities operated by PASNY currently generate 
electricity at a cost of only 0.5 cents per kilowatt hour (Dyson 1981) 
This contrasts sharply with the cost generating el eeltrier y £
petroleum, which is the marginal source of power for H«, Y“ k
Fuel costs alone for oil-generated electricity * se facilities
(Dvson 1981), Thus the economic rents associated with t ^Dyson, i-you . , - ner vear. This translates into
22?  $250 1 23 *per“residential ‘electric customer (annually). > Since PASNY 
felfs the hydropower a f  cost these economic rents are passed on to elec­
tricity customers.
Table 1 summarizes where PASNY's hydropower 80*8- ^ il®
f i, .old directly to the aluminum industry, the bulk of this 
percen , d to the ultimate customers via municipals and coop-power is transferred to the j. hydropower remaining m
S f  ftfte°r58ln3re8end. ”  In ^ industrial sector, lile 41.7% goes to 
residential ^ anf commercial uses. Thus, in addressing ^  
to the residential sector, the PASNY proposal did not ®U8^ o r t leaves 
the majority of the state's committments. However the report leaves
1 Nameplate capacity of PASNY's facilities at Niagara Falls and M
combined amounts to 3,102 megawatts or approximately 20*. of the 
state's capacity. Ignoring capital costs associated with these fac 
ities, multiply the difference in fuel costs (6 ^
amount of hydropower generated each year to order of
1nno run value of these economic rents will be of the same oraer or 
1 8 .t V  „ince the cost Of incremental capacity to generate electri­
f y  from’ coal i f  approximately equal to the variable costs of oil-
fired plants,
2 Enabling legislation requires PASNY to sell the hydropower at the
lowest possible cost". It should be noted however, that Longshore
(1981) found this not always to be the case xn practice.
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Table 1. The Allocation of Hydropower in New York State
Contracts $ of Subtotal Kilowatts % of Total
Contracts with industry 386,000 12.9
ALCOA 45.1 5.8Reynolds 51.8 6.7CMC 3.1 0.4
Sales to municipals and co-ops (1979) 547,200
Ultimate Use:
Residential 40. 7.3Commercial 20. 3.6Industrial 40. 7.3
Contracts with Upstate utilities* 1,829,982 60.8
Ultimate Use;
Residential 45.1 27.4Industrial 54.9 33.4
Sales out-of-state 245,000
Total 3,008,000 100.0
(nameplate capacity) (3,102,000)
* Niagara Mohawk (1,257,432 kw), NYSEG (422,550 kw), Rochester G & E
(170,000 kw).
Sources: Dyson, 1981 and private correspondence with PASNY.
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little doubt that electricity pricing in New York State is viewed as an 
important instrument of public policy.
What advice can the economist lend policy makers considering the 
problem of what to do with the state’s hydropower? This paper develops 
an empirical model of New York designed to enable a comparison of alter 
native allocations of the economic rents associated with this natural
resource. Particular emphasis is placed on hydropower
cated to industry. By taking a general equilibrium approach both dire t 
and indirect effects of alternative allocation schemes are captured. 
The model is calibrated for 1977, based on the most recent data avail­
able Simulation results indicate that several policy alternatives 
exist which would prove more effective in promoting any one of a number 
of distinct state policy objectives, including: increased income,
employment, manufacturing output, and electricity conservation.
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XI. WHY GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM?
Because the economic rents from the state’s hydropower are passed 
through to a subset of customers, they result in divergent average 
prices paid for electricity. Table 2 provides 1977 price data for five
groups of electricity users. Even after adjusting for cost of service 
differentials, chemicals and primary me1als appear to pay substantially 
less for their power. They are of special interest due to their inten­
sive use of electricity, consuming 38% (1977) of the total demanded by 
New York manufacturing. Other (relatively electricity extensive) manu­
facturing pays less, in turn, than residential and commercial users. 
Thus the current allocation of hydropower may be roughly characterized 
as one in which electricity intensive users receive a large share of the 
rents, in the form of lower average prices.
A general equilibrium approach to the analysis of this differential 
pricing of electricity in New York State was selected in deference to 
extensive work in the field of pub 1ic finance. 3 This research illus­
trates that partial equilibrium analysis of partial factor subsidies 
(i.e., they do not apply to all factors equally) can lead to seriously 
faulty conclusions. Harberger's (1962) use of a two sector, two factor 
general equilibrum model to analyze the economic effects of the corpor- 
ate income tax is a classic" in this area. Like later applications in 
areas such as property taxation (Miezskowski, 1972) and the preferential 
treatment of household product ion (Bo skin, 1973) this general equilib­
rium analysis has led to some useful insights.
A simple diagram captures the essence of these models. Consider 
the case of an economy divided into two sectors: one which is energy
intensive (I), and one which is energy extensive (X). The derived 
demand schedules for energy resources (R) in both sectors are provided 
in Figure 3. Assume that the price in in if ial equil ib r ium is pR > 
while equilibrium quantities are given by Rj- and Rx . Consider first 
the effect of introducing a partial factor subsidy amounting to $Q per 
unit of R employed m  sector I. This subsidy lowers the effective price 
of R facing the firms in sector I, which encourages them to employ more 
of that input. If the supply of R to sector I were perfectly elastic, 
then the new price of R to this sector would be PR* = pR _ q ’ 
resulting m  Rj* of the input being utilized. 4 This exogeneity of 
factor prices is precisely what is assumed when partial equilibrium 
analysis is conducted.
What if the supply of energy in this economy is fixed? Then any 
additional units of R employed in sector I must be bid away from
3
This work built upon earlier research in the theory of international 
trade (e.g., Stolper-Samuelson, 1941).
4 For the purposes of this diagram, it is assumed that the value of 
marginal product for R in each of the sectors is independent of the 
amount of other inputs employed. This means that the derived demand 
schedules do not shift in or out in response to the movement of these 
other factors between sectors.
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Table 2. Average Electricity Prices, by Sector 
in $/kwh
New York State, 1977
Sector Actual
Adjusted for Cost of 
Service Differential***
Commercial
(Small light & power) 0.061* 0.039
Residential 0.059* 0.037
Electricity Extensive 
Manufacturing 0.030** 0.030
Chemicals 0.018** 0.018
Primary Metals
(Primary non-ferrous)
0 .012**
(0.006)**
0.012
Sources: * Edison Electric Institute.
** Annual Survey of Manufacturers. ,.Annual . y * . Hi crribution cost of service differential *** A transmission and distnbut . easurfiQ
was computed by Baughmann and Bottaro ( tight
the differential cost of servicing small power and Ught 
customers vs. large power and Ught customers for the Mtddl
Atlantic States. In 1972 this was found to be $0.15/kwh of 
electricity delivered. In 1977 dollars this amounts to 
$0.22/kwh, which was deducted from the average price pai y 
the residential and commercial sectors m  order to arrive at 
the adjusted figure. This permits comparison prices paid
across sectors.
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corapeting uses in Che rest of the economy. The curve in the second 
graph provides a measure of the value of incremental units of the energy 
resource in the production of X, Assuming that R is perfectly mobile 
between the two sectors, an equilibrum will be reached when the presub™ 
sidy price of R rises to PR\  The result of the subsidy is to shift 
( %  ~ Rx') = (Ri** - Rj) units of the resource from sector X to
sector I. This is strictly a general equilibrium effect.
From the point of view of economic efficiency, it is clear that the 
subsidy has driven a wedge between the marginal value product of R m  
the two sectors. The excess burden associated with this type of distor- 
tion has been approximated by Harberger (1962) as the area of the two 
shaded triangles» Perhaps more influential are the conclusions which 
can be drawn regarding the incidence of the subsidy. Since the price 
paid for the natural resource input rises in both sectors, all owners o 
natural resources benefit from the subsidy, not just those in the su si- 
dized sector (I).
Up until this point the impact of the subsidy on other factors of
production has been ignored. If it is assumed that these other factors 
have been lumped together into the aggregate input N, this means that 
these other factors are constrained to be substitutes in production U n  
the Hicks-Alien sense) with the natural resource input (R) • Thus a 
decrease in the price of R facing firms in sector I will lead to a drop 
in the intensity with which N is utilized. As the price of R facing 
firms in sector X rises (assuming a fixed supply of R), they will su 
stitute away from it. Abstracting from changes m  the composition of 
output in the economy, a movement of factor N from sector I to sector X 
is expected. Assuming factor markets clear, PN will be forced to 
adjust in order to equate the release of factors from I to their absorp­
tion in X. 5 This represents yet an additional dimension of the inci­
dence problem. Not only does the partial factor subsidy on R m  sector 
I affect the rate of return on R in sector X, it also affects payments 
to other factors of production. 6
5 Note that the change in PN would be even larger if the price of the 
natural resource (PR) were fixed exogenously. In addition, xt is
clear that this factor incidence effect is eliminated if is fixed 
exogenously.
6 Tj,is analysis has abstracted from the impact of these factor price 
changes on the composition of output in the economy. In order to
introduce commodity markets it is necessary to turn to the well-known 
mathematical formulation of the 2 x 2 model. Qualitative results 
developed by Jones (1965) demonstrate the important role played by 
elasticities of substitution in production and relative factor shares 
in determining the likely effects of factor subsidies. In the case of 
a partial factor subsidy on the natural resource input m  sector I 
(the resource intensive sector), the direction of the resulting output 
effect cannot be determined. However, the impact on relative factor 
returns is unambiguous. The price of natural resources rises relative 
to the price of other factors of production (Hertel, 1983a).
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After developing the computable general equilibrum model in Sec­
tions III and IV, we will draw on this qualitative analysis of partial 
factor subsidies in the interpretation of simulation results.
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III. model description
The empirical model of New York State consists of six sectors, four 
primary factors of production, and intermediate inputs of
sectors summarize manufacturing activity m  the state. These are^ 
primary metals (P), chemicals (C), and other manufacturing (X) The 
first two are of special interest due to their intensive use of rela­
tively inexpensive electricity discussed above. Non-manufacturing 
activity is divided into three sectors: agriculture and non-energy
mining (A), wholesale/retail activity (W), and a residual category ()
(finance and insurance, real estate, construction, non-energy utilities, 
transport and government enterprises). All of these are assum P V
the same (commercial/non-subsidized) rate for electricity.
The four primary factors of production are capital (K), iabor (L) 
and an energy resource aggregate (R), consisting of ™
purchased fuels (F) (see, for example, Fuss, 1977). The £ir 8 , f
tors (K and L) are assumed to be in fixed supply, while the pricesi of 
the two energy inputs are determined exogenously by national fuel 
costs.* 7 (Marginal electricity output comes from under-utilized, oil 
fired plants, so that the price of electricity is tied to the price of
imported fuel.)
Aggregate Production Structure and IndustryJBehavi^
There are both theoretical and empirical issues involved in speci­
fying sectoral production functions. Due to the difficulty of obtaining 
observations on inter-industry transactions, it is; customary to «sor 
to an input-output table in handling the sectoral demand for 
ate inputs (e.g., Fullerton, et al. , 1 9 7 8 ) .  However,
are excessively restrictive for primary inputs. Accordingly, the 
assumption of weak separability of primary factors from intermediate
7 In order to treat the energy inputs as primary factors of production,
several important assumptions are required. First, it is assumed that 
the capacity for generating electricity is fixed m  the *t T f Z ’oll- 
that at the margin, electricity in the state is gener 
fired facilities. Since there is currently substantial excess capa 
city in the electric utility sector, it is furtner assumed that the 
short-run, marginal cost of additional power is approximated by the 
cost of the petroleum required to generate it. But New York imports 
virtually all of the purchased fuels (coal, oil and natural ga ) that 
it consumes. Treating the processing and delivery of these fuels as a 
simple mark-up over the cost of the raw fuel, it can b e ass™ e^ 8 
the price of purchased fuels is fixed exogenously. The infinitely 
elastic supply of fuel means that, in the short run, the marginal cost 
of generating^electricity is constant. Assuming constant distribution 
co.fr the price of electricity may be fixed exogenously. As their 
production is assumed to place no additional demands on state factor 
markets electricity and purchased fuels become primary factors of 
production. This means that the processes by which these inputs are 
produced and delivered to customers may be ignored.
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inputs is made, and this is a sufficient condition for the existence of 
a primary factor aggregate. The latter may be expressed as: 
N = N [K, L , R(E,F) ] , where R is the function defining the energy 
resource aggregate. It will be assumed that N exhibits constant returns 
to scale.
The fixed coefficient production function for sector P, with the
primary factor aggregate imbedded, can be expressed as:
o„„„t ■
Output is a function of the primary factor aggregate Np, and the 
intermediate inputs from sectors X, C, P, A, W, and 0, none of which may 
be substituted for one another. The a^'s are fixed input-output 
coefficients, and the primary factor aggregate has been scaled such that 
one unit of this aggregate is required to produce one unit of output.
Dual to this fixed coefficient production function is a unit cost 
function which is independent of output under constant returns to scale. 
Cost minimization may be separated into three discrete steps. First, 
the sector selects a cost minimizing combination of electricity and pur­
chased fuels to be employed in the energy aggregate: Pr ” p (p , 
PF) . The second step involves the choice between K, L, and R in the 
primary factor aggregate. This unit cost function may be written as:
cp ~ cpt PR’ PL> Pr ^Pe ’ Pp)J•
At the third, and final stage of cost minimization, substitution among 
inputs is not permitted and the resulting cost function is additive.
Of the six productive sectors in this model, four (A, 0, W, and X) 
are assumed to exhibit zero profits. However, primary metals and chemi­
cals are national, oligopolistic entities and may thus have non—zero 
profits. It is hypothesised that the equilibrium price and output in 
these markets are determined nationally, and are essentially exogenous 
to New York in any given year. Furthermore, it is assumed that they 
have chosen to produce a portion of this output in the state precisely 
due to the accessibility of cheap, reliable electric power. It is abso­
lutely essential that the model capture this locational flexibility, 
because one of the main arguments against raising electricity rates in 
these sectors is that the locational process will work in reverse That 
is, marginal production, and eventually entire firms, may be shifted out 
of the state.
Output Determination in Primary Metals and Chemicals
In order to estimate the sensitivity of output allocation, in the 
primary metals and chemicals sectors, to unit production costs, a mathe­
matical formulation was sought which would predict each state’s share in 
national output. In addition, it is desirable that the model logically 
preclude negative shares. One appropriate formulation is provided by
-li­
the logistics function (Berkson, 1944; Theil, 1969) where each state's 
share of national output may be expressed as a function of its unit cost 
of production relative to those of all other states m  the sample.
Formally, this may be expressed (for primary metals) as.
f*. i
si = pi/pUS f«x
(1 + %  e k)
f£ - APj£ + BP ln(ck) k - 1, 2, ..., n, ous.
Here, Pi and Pnq represent output in the primary metals sector in
state i, and the entire U.S., respectively. The logistics function is 
used to approximate state i!s share in national output (Sf), and the 
indices (ff) are linear functions of the logarithm of each state s 
unit production costs. The data set consists of n states, and the rest 
of the U .S. (ous).
By defining the rest of the D.S. as the base region and setting: 
f. « f* - f* « (AP* - AP* ) + BP(In (c.) - In (c^)),
the indices become:
f-i APi + BP In (c^c^g), for i - 1,
n .
Furthermore, by considering the ratio Si/S0us, denominators can­
cel. In logarithms# the model may be expressed as:
In (S./S )1 ous In (P./P„, )1 O U S
AP . + BP - In (c ./c ).i i i ous
Note that ci represents the minimum unit cost of production, given 
factor prices in state i. Because disaggregate intermediate input costs 
are not available at the state level, estimation of the model will 
require that c; be a function of primary factor prices alone. (These 
are the prices which will be varied in the course of the policy simula­
tions in Section V). The assumption implicit m  this specification o 
the oligopolistic models is that the relative costs of intermediate 
inputs (between states) do not change.
Finally, note that cost minimization in the oligopolistic sectors 
occurs at the state level, while price determination is a national phe 
nomenon. This means that state level profits and losses will exist, 
even in the long run. These profits and losses m  sectors P and C are
8 Baughmann, et al. (1979) utilized the logistics function in a similar 
context. Rather than "sharing out" a primary factor aggregate, ey 
allocate a national energy aggregate to individual states, based on
relative energy costs.
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ass uraed to be absorbed by the national entity, thus eliminating any 
question of their distribution among economic actors in New York State.
Model Structure
Having sett led on a structure for each of the productive sectors, 
the next task is to outline the manner in which they are linked together 
in a general equilibrium model. There are four sets of equations in the 
mode! outlined in Figure 1. The first group (A) describes the relation­
ship between factor intensities and factor prices. These equations are 
independent of output levels because constant returns to scale are spe­
cified . Since only four of the six sectors are perfectly competitive 
there are four zero profit conditions in this model [equations (l)-(4)] ! 
The existence of an energy resource aggregate in each of the sectors 
(PRj) is reflected in the next six equations. Note that, even if 
the prices of electricity (PE) and purchases of fuels (PF) are equal 
m  each of two sectors, there is no reason to believe that the prices of 
the respective aggregates will be equal. The latter will depend on the 
mix of the two energy inputs used in each sector.
Equations (11) through (16) are the unit cost functions associated 
with each of the six primary factor aggregates. Differentiation of 
these with respect to factor prices gives the intensities with which 
each factor is employed in this aggregate. The mix of energy inputs 
employed m  the energy resource aggregate is found by taking the deriva- 
tive of the latter with respect to the price of an individual energy 
input. The overall intensity of electricity (aEj) is found by mul­
tiplying the intensity with which electricity is employed in producing 
the resource aggregate, by the latter’s intensity in overall output
(aERjaRj)• Derivation of these energy intensit ies for all six
sectors is captured by equations (35)-(68) .
The locational submodels for primary metals and chemicals are out­
lined in equations (69)-(86). They replace the missing zero profit 
conditions. Equations (69)—(77) describe how New York State's share of 
national output in the primary metals sector is determined. The ratio 
of primary factor cost in state j to that in the rest of the U.S. (the 
base region) is related to an index: fPj via the functions (69)-(75).
The logistics function in equation (76) utilizes these indices to deter­
mine New York* s share of the national primary factor aggregate (CAGP/ 
CAGPUS), Because CAGPUS is assumed to be determined exogenously, the 
magnitude of primary factor expenditures in the state is now known. 
Based on cp, the unit cost of producing this aggregate, total output 
allocated to the state (P) can be found. A similar model for chemicals 
is described by equations (78)-(84). Since the number of states in the 
pooled data set is smaller (5 as opposed to 7 in the case of primary 
metals), the number of indices (fCm ) is smaller.
The remaining equations comprise the final demand conditions and 
accounting identities in the New York State model. Equation (87) gener­
ates state income (Y) as the sum of the returns to domestically owned 
primary factors. Since electricity prices vary by sector, each source 
of electricity revenue must be separately entered. (CDe represents
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Figure 2. The Empirical Model
(A) Intensities and Fricea
(»-<*): Epx * h pw poE’ “ U H p r p k ^  PC PP PX PA PW P0]’
(4x9)
(5)-U0): PKj - PRj(pEj’ PF5
(ll)-<16)t
e3 ““ V  A ’
u  - C, P, X, A, W, 0)
(17)-(34): aKJ " 6cj/5pRj
*Kj ' Scj/5pK
• u  K
’ (Sc^/6pL
(35)-(68): ■ V ipEj
&FRj ” 6pRj/6pF
"El ’*
aFj '" &FRjaRj
(13) L o ca t iona l Submodels
(69)-(75): f?k " " k  + * “ l ' 2....
7.
(76): CAGP - |exp(fPNY)/(l + Ikexp(fPk))]CAGPDs
(77): f  » CAGF/Cp
£7B)-(84): fr - 'AC + BCln(c /c ) n - 1, 2....a m , ouB
5.
(85): CAGC - Iexp(fCjjy)/(l + Ija«xp(fC(a))]cAGCT3S
(E6): C «• CAGC/cc
Final Demand
(87) Y - p.K* + + pecde + PEP«a F + pk *ecc + pex*ex^ + PEWaEWy
+ PeOSEG° + pEAaEAfl - PFaFE(£ * ^O1
(88)-(94) CDi - D5jY/?i (i " E> F, F, C. X, W, A)
(95 ) Y -  IpjCDj^
(D) Accounting
(96) -(105):
' e " CB_ " E ’ 0 1
0 c d f KEF
X 0 0
L 0 0
c ~ c “ a>„c NEC
F -  U > * P + CDp + NEP
X
( 10x 6)
X CDX NEX
A A ° A
0
H U CDW
0
_ 0 . 0 _ _CD0 „ _ 0 .
(Quantity ” (Intermediate + (Final + (Net Exports) 
Available) Demand) Deiaand)
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the final demand for electricity.) The last term in the factor income 
expression indicates that, as electricity use in the state is changed 
from its init ial equilibrium level (Eq ), purchased fuel imports also 
change. (The coefficient apg indicates the amount of purchased 
fuels required to generate a unit of electricity.)
Equations (88)-(94) indicate that the final demand (including con­
sumption , investment and government demands) for commodity i (CD£) is 
assumed to remain a constant share of total income (DS^). Since the 
demand shares are constrained to sum to one, the equation for one sector 
(0) has been omitted, and the budget constraint becomes equation (9 5). 
The final group of equations summarize the accounting conditions. NE£ 
is the net export of product i. With PE and pp determined exogen­
ously, domestic availability of these factors is endogenous. In the 
case of purchased fuels it is assumed that all supplies are imported 
(F - 0, NEF < 0). Both electricity and purchased fuels are employed in 
intermediate as well as final uses. A* is a 10 x 6 matrix of factor 
intensities. The other point worthy of note is that the only commodi­
ties which are tradeable in the model are C, P and X (i.e., manufactur­
ing output). The other sectors are forced to match state supply with 
state demands in equilibrium.
The relationship between equilibrium prices and intensities on the 
one hand, and production, consumption and net export levels on the 
other, depends on the degree to which state prices are determined exog­
enously (by the rest of the nation). Samuelson (1953) has demonstrated 
that there are three important cases for a competitive economy exhibit­
ing constant returns to scale.
i) When the number of exogenous commodity prices equals the number 
of endogenous factor prices, equilibrium prices and intensities 
are independent of output levels.
il) When the number of exogenous commodity prices exceeds the num­
ber of endogenous factor prices, specialization will occur, 
with some sectors* output dropping to zero.
iii) Only when there are more endogenous factor prices than exogen­
ous commodity prices will factor intensities and price levels 
depend on final demand.
Since sectors C and P are not constrained by zero profit condi­
tions, their exogenous commodity prices may be ignored in considering 
Samuelson* s cases. This leaves two endogenous factor prices (pg and 
?l ), and only one competitive sector with an exogenous commodity price 
(X). Thus case (iii) applies, and factor intensities in this model will 
depend on factor endowments and final demand. Note that if one addi­
tional price is fixed, only 68 endogenous variables remain in equations 
1-68 (A), and Samuelson* s Non-substitutability Theorem (1966) holds
(case (i)).
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IV. MODEL ESTIMATION AND CALIBRATION
Table 3 outlines expenditure shares for each of the six sectors of 
ThP intermediate input cost shares were obtained from a
..‘ u,,* technological
Ill costechateao£0neachTf Ihe loot ptinarj. factota of production in the
from left to right according to electricity s share „  the M * ™ «  ;
Recall however, that these sectors face different electri y P 
(Table 2) and a comparison of relative cost shares will understate the 
differences in physical factor intensities. Despite paying a lower 
price, primary metals again stand out as being particularly “ ten81're «  
the use of electricity, with agriculture and non-energy mining at the
other extreme.
The initial impact of introducing (or eliminating) partial factor
subsidies will be largely determined by the sign fa:‘dtQmrasSno* 1f “prodUc t ion 
n.rtial elasticities of substitution among primary factors of production 
rt 1083c) Thus it is desirable to estimate the primary factor
- j s s s v : a . t e a r  *  s
r u f S X .
9 Since a recent input-output table was not £ * W
State an algorithm developed by Boisvert and Bills (1976) for gee 
atine* regional X-0 tables was employed. Their approach involves 
imposing national production technology on the s t a t e t ‘ then 
disaggregate level (4 digit SIC code sectors). The table i. then 
aggregated to the desired degree, using state employment data, to 
a?fiv! at the appropriate sectoral composition. The 1972 national I-Q 
table was used, along with 1977 employment data from the U.S. Bureau 
of the Census' County Business Patterns.
1 Ofiu,, R„rv«v of Manufactures data set includes observations on
and aoat)t. Ini8adaf “ °atietivelv detailed information on energy consumption is available over 
the period 1971-78. Data on the quantity and cost of energy consumed 
are provided for electricity, fuel oil, coal and natura! gas How- 
everP the electricity data i s the only complete series, with the other 
three categories containing numerous gaps at the two-digit level. 
Thus all of the latter inputs were aggregated into one category, pur­
chased fuels, for which the time series was complete.
This cost and quantity information permitted construction of pri­
mary factor cost shares and average price series for, inputs L, E, and
F Capital’s cost share was then determined as a residual. The price 
0j capital' was constructed according to the HalWorgenson (1967)
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cost functions could be estimated. Expenditure data for the remaining 
sectors (W, 0, and A) are not readily available at the state level, and 
this data problem forced the use of simpler, Cobb—Douglas cost func­
tions. Constant cost shares for the primary factor aggregate in these 
Cobb-Douglas sectors were obtained by combining information from the 
regionalized input—output table with labor cost data from County Busi— 
ness Patterns,
Translog Cost Functions
Figure 2 provides the translog cost structure for primary metals. 
These replace the conditions for unit costs and intensities (for j - P) 
written in general form in Figure 1, Equations (1) through (3) describe 
the first step of the firm1 s optimization exercise. At this point the 
cost minimizing mix of electricity and purchased fuels, comprising the 
energy aggregate (R), is selected. An analogous set of equations (4)- 
(7 ) describes cost minimization with respect to the (translog) primary 
factor aggregate cost function. Recall that the intensity with which 
electricity and purchased fuels are employed in the primary factor 
aggregate is equal to the intensity with which they are employed in R, 
multiplied by the intensity with which the energy aggregate is employed 
in the primary factor aggregate (equations 8 and 9). The cost structure 
for the other two manufacturing sectors (C and X) is identical to that 
in Figure 2.
The Cobb-Douglas sectors' cost structure may be derived by simply 
setting all of the second order terms in Figure 2 equal to zero. This 
forces cost shares to remain constant in the face of changes in relative 
prices, and the log of unit cost simply equals the weighted sum of the 
logs of individual prices and an intercept term. In addition, since the 
Cobb-Douglas functional form imposes separability among all inputs, the 
energy submodel is no longer necessary. Thus the cost strueture in Fig­
ure 2, with all second order terras equal to zero, is equivalent to a 
single stage, Cobb-Douglas model with four inputs: K, L , E , and F .
It is important to point out that the sectoral models outlined here 
embody the maintained hypothesis of cost minimization in all sectors. 
In order to derive variable input-output coefficients (factor intensi­
ties) , Shephard’s Lemma must be invoked. While it is theoretically pos­
sible to test for cost minimization in the translog framework (e.g. 
Appelbaum, 1978), the conclusions will not be definitive given the limi­
tations of the pooled data sets employed here. Thus, in this research 
effort, the hypothesis that all of the cost functions are well-behaved 
is maintained but not tested. Instead, the methodology involves esti­
mating ’’well-behaved" translog cost functions.
formula for the service price of capital. Effective corporate tax 
rates in individual states were estimated from information on federal 
and state corporate tax collections, as well as total U .S. corporate 
profits, following a procedure outlined by Field and Grebenstein
(1980).
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Figure 2 Translog Cost Structure for Primary Metals
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A continuous cost function is well-behaved if it satisfies the fol 
lowing three conditions:
i) symmetry and linear homogeneity in prices, 
ii) monotonicity, and 
iii) concavity in input prices.
The first condition can be imposed when the translog cost function is 
estimated (Binswanger, 1974), while the second and the third conditions 
must (in general) be checked,11 Monotonicity is satisfied all esti­
mated cost shares are non-negative. In the translog framework the_con­
cavity condition is most easily checked by working with the matrix of 
partial elasticities of substitution implied by the estimated coeffi­
cients, If this matrix is negative semi-definite, then so also is the 
matrix of second partial derivatives: {6ZC/6pf 6pj}, which m  turn
implies concavity of the cost function in input prices (Binswanger,
1974).
Data and estimation: There were two criteria for selecting the 
s t a t e T ^ T T h T l ^ n ^ r T n  these pooled data sets. State output m  the 
relevant sector must be (a) relatively large, and (b) similar in compo­
sition to their counterpart sector in New York. On this basis data sets 
consisting of six states, in the case of chemicals, and eight states xn 
the cases of primary metals and electricity extensive manufacturing were 
constructed.12 Zero and first order terms in the translog cost func­
tions are permitted to vary by state. Rearranging equations (2) and UJ 
from Figure 2 yields the two cost share equations for the energy *12
llLau (1974) has demonstrated that the Cholesky factorization of the 
Hessian matrix can be employed, in the estimation of flexible func­
tional forms, such that the desired monotonicity and concavity 
restrictions are imposed on the data. He proposes a maximum likeli­
hood estimator~which reduces to a quadratic programming problem ip. 
444).
12ln the case of chemicals, the composition criterion involved looking 
for states with a similar organic/inorganic mix of chemical produc­
tion The net result was the selection of Illinois, Michigan, New 
Jersey and Pennsylvania, in addition to New York and the remainder of 
the United States. This provided a pooled data set with 48 observa­
tions. For primary metals, the combined criteria of importance and 
composition led to the selection of Alabama, Indiana, Kentucky, New 
York Ohio, Tennessee, Texas and finally, the remainder of the U.S. 
All of the states in this group have substantial primary aluminum 
components in their primary metals sectors, while also producing fer­
rous metals. This yields 64 observations on cost shares and prices 
for sector P. Electricity extensive manufacturing is too diverse to 
enable the selection of states for pooling based on a single measure 
of composition. Instead, seven Middle Atlantic and North Central 
States which correspond to "old industrial states were selected. 
This group includes: Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio, Pennsylvania. When combined with the rest of the U.S. 
this yields eight cross-sectional units.
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aggregate. Since these shares are restricted to sum to one, only the 
electricity share equation is employed in the estimating form of the 
model. Efficiency is enhanced by adding the unit cost function to the 
estimating form of the model. Imposing symmetry as well as linear homo­
geneity in prices and in output, and writing the model in terms of devi­
ations from state means, results in the following estimating equations;
Eij (GENY GE j V  + V  ln(pEij/PFij) + Uij
DEV(lnPRi ‘ (GENY + GEjVDEV[ln(pE ../pF ..)] + G^DEVlO.5( lnpE . . )
- In p_..lnp_.. + 0.5(In p^. .)2] + v . . fEij fFij fFij ij
where DEV[ ] indicates measurement in deviations from state means, 
i - years: 1971-1978, j - states, u, v are error terms, and Dj are
state dummy variables.
New York's intercept (Gg^y) provides the base value, with
intercept terms for state j equal to CGg^y + Ggj). Note that
these state specific intercepts are constrained to be equal across equa­
tions .13 Imposition of this constraint is one reason for estimating the 
equations simultaneously. In addition, since the terms u£j and 
v£j are assumed to be the result of errors in cost minimization, 
they are likely to be contemporaneously correlated within any given 
state. Thus Zellner's seemingly unrelated regression technique is 
employed. The iterative version of this technique is equivalent to 
maximum likelihood estimation, and thus insures uniqueness of the esti­
mates regardless of the share equation that is dropped (Kmenta and 
Gilbert, 1968).
The next level of cost minimization involves capital and labor 
inputs, as well as the energy resource aggregate. The absence of obser­
vations on output restricts estimation to share equations. In this 
instance, with three inputs, two share equations are estimated simul­
taneously. Estimating equations are provided below. Note that the 
labor share equation has been dropped and the equations have been nor­
malized on the price of labor,
DEV[SKij]= + BKRDEV[ln(PRi A i j )] + “Kij
^Alternatively, one may postulate that state effects are stochastic and 
thus are subsumed in the error terra. Error components estimators 
takes this interregional variation into account, thus increasing effi­
ciency (Maddala, 1971). However, the latter models must assume that 
the cross-sectional effects are truly random and thus not correlated 
with the exogenous variables. Furthermore, Swaray and Arora (1972) 
find that, when the number of cross sections is small, the error com­
ponents estimator may not be more efficient than estimating state 
specific intercepts.
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DEV[Sr..]= BKRDEV[ln(pK i ./pL i .)] + B RRDEV[ln(pRij/pU j )l + “Rij
Once again, i 58 years, j » states, and and uKi j are 
error terms. Cross-section effects are implicitly included because the 
logarithmic price ratios are in terras of deviations from state means 
(DEV[ ]).
State intercepts may be computed directly from the relevant state s 
mean logarithm of prices and shares, along with the estimated slope 
coefficients. For example, the intercept for New York's capital share 
equation is provided by the following equation:
BKNY “ SKNY ' BKKln(pKNY/piNY) " BKRln(PRNY/pLNY)
Note that the intercepts will vary, depending on the units in which 
prices are defined. They are thus "scale-dependent". For this reason 
the econometric estimates of these intercepts are rescaled as part of 
the model's calibration.
The iterative Zeliner estimates of the slope coefficients for pri­
mary metals, chemicals and electricity extensive manufacturing are pro­
vided in Tables 4, 5, and 6 , respectively. The t-statistics are pro­
vided in parentheses below each estimate. Note that these t-statistics 
can be used to test the departure of the production structures from a 
Cobb-Douglas form. In the case of the latter, when all of these second 
order coefficients would be zero (i.e., relative price changes do not 
affect cost shares). Derived demand elasticities implied by the esti­
mated coefficients are also provided in these tables, along with the 
associated standard errors.
Consider first the energy submodel for primary metals. The esti­
mate for GEE and the associated demand elasticities are provided 
at the top of Table 4. The large t-statistic (14.67) associated with 
Gee indicates that a constant cost share (Cobb-Douglas) aggregation 
function is not appropriate. The implication of the low demand elasti­
cities is that there is little room for changing the composition of the 
energy aggregate employed in the primary metals sector. This result 
conforms with expectations for the pooled data set selected, in which 
primary aluminum consumes a large share of the electricity employed in 
this sector. The process of aluminum reduction has been uniquely tied 
to electricity as a source of energy, thus implying that the substitut­
ability between electricity and purchased fuels is very limited.
I'+These derived demand elasticities (E £ j' s) are simple, Linear func­
tions of the estimated parameters for given values of the shares:
Eij = (Bij/Si) + Sj for alL i * j •
Eli = (Bii/Si) + Si - 1.
Thus standard errors may be attached to the elasticities as follows. 
SE(Eij) - SE(Bij)/Si and SE(Eij) “ SE(TS i i >/S i-
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Table 4 Primary Metals Cost Function
Energy Submodel
Estimated Coefficient 
(t statistic in parentheses) 
Electricity
E 0.1860
(14.67)
Unit cost function 0,990
Electricity share equation 0.875
Derived Demand Elasticities (1977) 
(standard errors in parentheses)* 
Electricity Purchased Fuels
E -0.13
(0.03)
0.13
F
*
mo$o -0.09
0.988
0.857
Primary Factor Aggregate
Estimated Coefficients 
(t statistic in parentheses)
Capital Energy
K 0.0098 -0.0108
(0.829) (-1.688)
R 0.09787
(9.995)
£ t
Energy share equation 0.807 
Capital share equation 0.405
0.804
0.396
Derived Demand Elasticities (1977) 
(standard errors in parentheses)*
Capital Energy Labor
K -0,58 0.11 0.47
(0.03) (0.02)
R 0.32 -0,15 -0.17
(0.05) (0.07)
L 0.40 -0.05 -0.35
* Elasticities involving purchased fuels, and labor, are derived from the
homogeneity restriction.
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Iterative Zeliner estimates for the primary factor aggregate in 
sector P are provided at the bottom of Table 4. The R^ statistics ind i- 
cate a rather poor fit for the capital share equation. This may well be 
due to the fact that capital* s cost share has been derived as a resi­
dual. Furthermore, idle capacity has been a chronic problem in the pri­
mary metals sector in recent years, and this is not considered in the 
derivation of the service price of capital. The cross-demand elastici­
ties for which standard errors may be easily computed are all substan­
tially different from zero. They indicate that labor and energy are 
complementary inputs in this sector. Thus, a rise in the price of the 
energy aggregate (holding output and - other prices constant) causes a 
drop in employment. Finally, this primary factor cost function is not 
concave in input prices throughout the sample period. However, it is 
well-behaved for the 1977 and 1978 New York State observations. 15 This 
is very important because 1977 is the benchmark year for the model.
Coefficients resulting from iterative Zellner estimation of the 
chemical sector's two-stage cost function are presented, along with the 
implied demand elasticities, in Table 5. The estimate of the second 
order coefficient in the energy submodel appears to be substantially 
different from zero, with a t-value of 23.67. The primary factor aggre­
gate for chemicals was estimated using energy and capital share 1
1 $Out of a total of 64 sample points in the pooled data set, the cost 
function for sector P's primary factor aggregate was quasi-concave 
(one positive characteristic root) for 24 of the observations. Almost 
all of these il 1—behaved points fell in the first half of the sample 
period (1971-1974). The explanation for this pattern of quasi­
concavity is readily explicable upon consideration of the tremendous 
change in the cost share of energy in sector P 's primary factor aggre­
gate (Sg) over this period. This share doubles in many of the 
states in the pooled data set. However, in New York State it starts 
out at a relatively low level (9%), and its increase is more modest 
(to 13%). Since the Allen partial elasticities of substitution are 
inversely related to this factor share, these elasticities also vary 
substantially over the sample period. The formula for the own partial 
elasticity of substitution for the energy aggregate is:
aRR = (bRITsr )/sR2 + 1 *
While Sg varies over the sample period, the estimated coefficient 
(Bgg) is constant and positive for sector P. Thus, a very small 
value for Sg can lead to a positive own price elasticity which in 
turn disrupts the conditions for concavity in input prices.
The policy experiments carried out below involve increasing the 
price of energy (electricity) paid by sector P. Given the relatively 
inelastic demand for this input in primary metals production, this 
means that the cost share of energy will increase from their benchmark 
(1977) value, keeping the outcome in the well-behaved portion of the 
cost function. However, the fact remains that the cost function for 
sector P is only locally well-behaved.
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Table 5 Chemicals Sector Cost Function
Energy Submodel
Estimated Coefficient 
(t statistic in parentheses) 
Electricity
E -0.0973
(-23.67)
Derived Demand Elasticities (1977) 
(standard errors in parentheses)* 
Electricity Purchased Fuels
-0.95
( 0 . 01 )
0.95
Unit cost function 0.960
Electricity share equation 0.592
R^
0.954
0.532
0.49 -0.49
Primary Factor Aggregate
Estimated Coefficients 
(t statistics in parentheses)
Capital Energy
K -0.0010 -0.0031
(-0.23) (-1.76)
R 0.0334
(0.437)
Energy share equation
R
0.893
II
0.890
Capital share equation 0.796 0.791
Derived Demand Elasticities (1977) 
(standard errors in parentheses)*
Capital Energy Labor
K -0.29 0.04 0.25
(0.006) (0.002)
R 0.67 -0.24 -0.43
(0.037) (0.075)
L 0.75 -0.08 —0.67
* Elasticities involving purchased fuels * and labor, are derived from the
homogeneity restriction.
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equations , with a much better fit for the latter than, was the case for 
sector P, Once again, labor and energy are complementary inputs. Also 
worthy of note is the fact that the estimated own price elasticity for 
energy is substantially greater for chemicals than it was for primary 
metals. For New York State's cost shares, this cost function is well- 
behaved over the period 1974-78.^
The last of the sectors for which a two-stage cost function was 
estimated is the electricity extensive manufacturing sector (X). Ordi­
nary least squares estimation of the second order coefficient rn the 
unit cost function and the share equation separately yielded roughly the 
same value (0.09), However, when estimated as a system, with cross 
equation restrictions, this second order coefficient doubled to 0.18. 
The larger estimate resulted in a positive own price effect for electri­
city in the energy submodel, and was thus rejected in favor of the sin­
gle equation estimate taken from the electricity share equation (see 
Table 6).17 Estimation of the translog primary factor aggregate in 
sector X is identical to that in the previous two sectors. The two 
share equations exhibit relatively high values, and labor is once 
again complementary to energy, while capital-energy and labor-capital 
relationships are characterized as substitutes. This cost function is 
well-behaved over 57 of the 64 data points including 1974-78 for New 
York State.
Comparison with estimates from the literature: Over the la&»t ten 
years, a great deal of research has been directed towards the estimation, 
of the elasticities of substitution between energy, and labor or capital 
inputs in the manufacturing sector. Turning first to the elasticity of 
substitution between capital and energy (eKR), there are two dis­
tinct groups of estimates. The first group of studies (Berndt and Wood, 
1975; Berndt and Jorgenson, 1973; Norsworthy and Harper, 1979) find that 
capital and energy are complementary inputs. A second group (Gregory 
and Griffin, 1976; Halvorsen and Ford, 1981; Pindyck, 1977) finds that
^Initial estimates of this cost function, using five states and the 
remainder of the U.S. in a pooled data set over the 1971-78 period, 
violated the restrictions implied by cost minimization. When evalu­
ated over a substantial portion of the data set (including all obser 
vat ions for New York State) it exhibited a positive own price effect 
for electricity. Upon closer examination of the pooled data set, it 
was found that there existed a rather large difference in the compo­
sition (organic/inorganic mix) of the chemical sector in the five 
individual states, as opposed to the rest of the U.S. When observa­
tions for the rest of the U.S. were dropped, the cost function was 
found to be well-behaved over 28 of the 40 sample points. (Early 
years in the data set are subject to the same small-share problem 
identified in the case of the primary metals cost function.) It is 
the latter group of estimated coefficients which were utilized in the 
model, and they are summarized in Table 5.
17jhe large difference between the single equation and system estimates 
may be explained by the fact that the latter constrains state-specific 
intercepts in the two equations to be equal.
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Table 6 Electricity Extensive Manufacturing Cost Function
Energy Submodel
Estimated Coefficient 
(t statistic in parentheses) 
Electricity
E 0.0929
(6.04)
Electricity share equation 0.744
Derived Demand Elasticities (1977) 
(standard errors in parentheses)* 
Electricity Purchased Fuels
. E -0.29 0.29
(0.03)
F 0.34 -0.34
E?
0.707
Primary Factor Aggregate
Estimated Coefficients Derived Demand Elasticities (1977)
(t statistics in parentheses) (standard errors in parentheses)*
Capital Energy Capital Energy Labor
K 0.0605 -0.003 K -0.490 0.020 0.470
(0.11) (-3.3) (0.009) (0.002)
R 0.021 R 0.385 -0.166 -0.219
(14.62) (0.034) (0.053)
L 0.495 -0.012 -0.483
li
Energy share equation 0.906 
Capital share equation 0.810
0.904
0.807
* Elasticities involving purchased fuels, and labor, axe derived from the
homogeneity restriction.
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they are substitutes in production, while another study (Fusss 1977) 
finds the elasticity of substitution between capital and energy 
(eKR) to be close to zero. These research efforts differ along a 
number of dimensions including: country of study, nature of the data 
(time series vs. cross section), production structure (some include 
materials, while others do not), and the definition of capital, Several 
studies have attempted to reconcile the divergent estimates on the basis 
of these differences.
Berndt and Wood (1979) have stressed the role of the materials 
input, noting that as long as firms .can substitute materials for the 
primary factor aggregate, estimates of the gross elasticity (holding the 
level of the aggregate constant), will overstate the net elasticity 
(holding total output constant). By employing some plausible values for 
key parameters, the authors conclude that the gross substitutability 
result of Griffin and Gregory is consistent with the hypothesis of net 
capital-energy complementarity. In the New York State model it is 
assumed that materials do not substitute for the primary factor aggre­
gate, so that net and gross elasticities are constrained to be equal. 
Thus, if such substitution does in fact exist, the fixed coefficient 
structure biases the estimate of the net elasticity in fawor of 
increased substitutability.
The definition of capital is also an important factor in explaining 
d iverse estimates of eRR. Field and Grebenstein (1980) point out 
that there are at least two important components to capital: physical 
stock and working capital. Furthermore, it is the use of data on cap­
ital stock which leads to the Berndt, et al. estimate of eKR < 0, 
whereas the studies concluding that & and R are substitutes have tended 
to work with the value of capital services derived as a residual. The 
latter procedure combines physical and working capital. By separating 
the two types of capital, Field and Grebenstein are able to show that, 
while services from the physical capital stock and energy are comple­
ment s, energy and working capital are substitutes in production. Since 
the data employed in this analysis treats the two ^ forms of capital 
together, it is perhaps not surprising that the implied capital-energy 
substitutability in manufacturing coincides with the conclusion of those 
studies using a similar definition of K.
It has also been pointed out that there may be a fundamental dif­
ference in the short run eRR as opposed to the long run elasticity 
of substitution between capital and the energy resource. Griffin and 
Gregory reconcile their result for cross-section data (eKR > 0) with 
the time series conclusions (eRR < 0) by arguing that they are cap­
turing long-run effects. They maintain that, in the short run, an 
increase in the price of energy renders a portion of the capital stock 
obsolete, hence reducing capacity utilization. However, in a recent 
study of the dynamic demand for inputs in U.S. manufacturing (Denny, e_t 
al., 1979), the authors find that physical capital and energy are long- 
run complements in all but a few sectors. Particularly interesting is 
that two of the exceptions are primary metals (eKR - 2.43) and chem­
icals (eRR = 0) (p. 37).
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Another parameter of great importance to the general equilibrium 
interactions in the New York State model is the elasticity of substitu­
te011 between labor and the energy aggregate (eLR). Turning again to 
the existing literature, there appears to be general agreement among 
static models of national manufacturing activity that labor and energy 
are substitutes. However, the results from recent dynamic models are 
mixed (e.g., Denny, et^  al., 1979). The interesting feature of the lat­
ter models is that the qualitative nature of input substitution may 
change between the short and the long run. For example, the authors 
find that labor and energy are short-run substitutes and long-run com­
plements in the primary metals sector.
Regional differences in the technology and composition of manufac­
turing activity can also play a significant role in explaining divergent 
findings. For example, the complementary relationships found in this 
study conform with an earlier study (Considine, 1981) which utilized 
pooied data for Middle Atlantic and North Central States to estimate 
cost share equations for the aggregated manufacturing sector. In addi­
tion, both of these investigations conclude that eKR > o. Finally 
it should be noted that labor and energy resources are substitutes in
the non-manufacturing sectors because of the Cobb-Douglas form which is 
assumed.
Locational Models: Estimation of the locational submodels for sec­
tors C and P is based upon the primary factor unit cost functions pro­
vided in the previous section. The model utilizes the logistics func­
tion (Berkson, 1941) to approximate each state's share in national out­
put . Consider first, the locational submodel for sector p provided in 
Table 7. On the left hand side is the log of the ratio of "output" 
allocated to state i to that allocated to the rest of the U.S. The 
explanatory variable is the log of the ratio of primary factor costs. 
The negative coefficient indicates that as production in i becomes more 
cosfciy, it will be shifted out of the state. This coefficient may be 
translated into the BP associated with equations (69)-(75) in Figure 2 
by adding one. Thus, with a ratio of cost shares on the left hand side, 
the coefficient: BP “ 0.151 applies. The high R2 associated with the
primary metals locational model indicates an excellent "fit" of the 
estimated model to the pooled data, when the intercept term is permitted 
to vary across states. The intercept (-2.556) is that for New York 
(APNY in Figure 2). The remaining intercepts, constructed by adding 
the relevant dummy coefficient to the New York intercept, are not shown 
here.
The locational submodel for the chemical sector is given at the 
bottom of Table 6 . The fact that (BC-1) is almost equal to -1 indicates 
that the allocation of primary factor cost shares to the states in the 
pooled data set is almost invariant to relative price changes because 
relative quantities change by an almost equal percentage. Once again 
the fit of this static model is quite good. ^ ® * 18
18It seemed quite possible that the desired allocation of national out­
put expenditures) to individual states might' not be achieved in the 
course single year, particularly if excess capacity did not exist.
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Table 7 Locational Submodels for Chemicals and Primary Metals
(t statistics in parentheses)
Primary Metals
ln(Q, /Q ) ^ -2.556 - 0.849 InCc.^/c ,e(.) + estimated state effects. Mit oust it oust
(-72.4) (-14.334) ,
for i ** 1, - - *» 7.
t - 1971-78
R2 = 0.992 
R2 » 0.991
- Chemicals
ln(0 /Q ) « -2.495 - 0.969 ln(c../c .) + estimated state effects, oust 3-t oust
(-11.8) (-5.1)
fo r  i  ** 1, • •»i 5.
t - 1971-78
R 2 * 0.965
0.959
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Model Calibration
Methods for calibrating computable general equilibrium models to 
benchmark data sets have been well documented (e.g., Mansur and Whalley, 
1981; St.-Hilaire and Whalley, 1982). They amount to translating 
observed "equilibrium" values into quantities by picking initial prices 
which are all equal to one. This permits scaling parameters in the pro­
duction (cost) functions to be derived through sectoral zero profit con­
ditions . In the case of Cob'b-Douglas technology, benchmark cost shares 
become the exponents, while use of CES technology requires that the con­
stant elasticity of substitution be provided exogenously. The translog 
cost functions employed for manufacturing sectors in the New York State 
model present a somewhat more complex problem, because both zero- and 
first-order terms are scale dependent. The calibration procedure 
adopted is to utilize equilibrium cost shares to pick the first-order 
terms (these are intercepts in the translog cost share equations), while 
using zero profit conditions to derive the zero-order term. * 19
Because interstate flows of commodities and factors of production 
are difficult to estimate, there is a serious gap in the benchmark data 
set. Where such data is available it is common to treat domestic and 
imported items as distinct products in order to replicate an observed 
equilibrium. While this may be plausible for national models, it is far 
less reasonable at the state level. In order to circumvent these prob­
lems, the prices of tradeable items are assumed to be determined in the 
national marketplace (exogenously), with net exports being determined as 
a residual. This means that initial equilibrium output levels are not 
constrained to equal observed levels. However, in order to assure a 
reasonable initial solution, payments to labor and capital are con­
strained to equal their observed values in initial equilibrium.
A final aspect of the model * s calibration is necessitated by the 
locational submodels for primary metals and chemicals. Recall that 
output is allocated to the state based on the production costs in New 
York, relative to those in the rest of the nation. In order to cali­
brate the model, these ratios are assumed to equal their observed (1977) 
values in initial equilibrium.
(This might be true for chemicals, but not for primary metals.) Thus, 
a geometric lag structure was added to the model. In the case of the 
chemical sector the lag structure was insignificantly different from 
zero, and in the case of primary metals the coefficient on the lagged 
endogenous variable was slightly negative. Based on these results, 
the static versions of these locational models were deemed most 
appropriate.
19The chemicals and primary metals sectors are non-competitive and thus 
may exhibit profits and losses. However, for purposes of calibration 
it is assumed that, in initial equilibrium, they are not earning prof­
its. (This condition is relaxed for the policy simulations.)
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V. PARTIAL AND GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSES:
EXPLORING THE STRUCTURE OF THE MODEL
Before proceeding to conduct policy simulations with this model, it 
iS useful to become acquainted with how it works that is, what hap- 
pens when, for example, manufacturing electricity prices increase. As 
was pointed out in Section II, general equilibrium effects of this 
removal of a partial factor subsidy may be very important. However, we 
will begin with a partial equilibrium analysis, insulating the subsi­
dized sectors from any feedback effects. This may be considered a first 
approximation, which does not require the full model. The next step 
will be to permit non-tradeable factor and commodity prices to vary, 
thereby initiating general equilibrium interactions. Comparison of the 
two outcomes should serve a dual purpose. Not only does it facilitate 
understanding of the model5s operation, it also sheds some light on the 
question of when one can expect partial equilibrium analyses to provide 
a good approximation to economy-wide outcomes.
Partial Equilibrium Results in the New York Model
The first column in Table 8 provides initial equilibrium values for
the New York State model in 1977. Removal of the subsidies implicit_m  
the current rate structure results in immediate electricity price 
increases to sectors P, C, and M of 217%, 111% and 27%, respectively. 
Because these are all tradeable sectors, commodity prices are_ fixed 
exogenously and general equilibrium interactions are initiated m  the 
factor markets. In particular, since the prices of (unsubsidized) elec­
tricity and purchased fuels are also fixed in this short run model, it 
is the markets for capital and labor which transmit the shock to non­
manufacturing sectors. Thus, holding PK and PL constant yields sec­
tors’ P, C, and X partial equilibrium responses to removal of the subsi­
dies. These are provided in the second column of the table.
Turning first to primary metals, electricity intensity (aEp) 
drops by only 24%, despite a 217% price hike. Purchased fuels substi­
tute marginally for electricity in this sector, but a drop in the inten­
sity with which the energy aggregate is employed results m  a p  
remaining almost unchanged. There is a slight drop (-1,95%) of the 
labor intensity in sector P, due to the fact that labor and electricity 
are complementary inputs. It appears that most of the electricity sav­
ings in response to the drastic price increase occurs as a result of 
capital-energy substitution. This is evidenced by an 8.6% increase m  
the intensity of capital services in the primary metals sector. The net 
result of this sector's cost minimising response to rate equalization is 
that the unit cost of the primary factor aggregate <Cp) rises by more 
than 10%. 1 This translates (through the oligopolistic, locational model) 
into an 8.1% drop in primary metals output allocated to the state.
Consideration of the value of aEC in column (2) of Table 4 
shows that the decline in electricity intensity in the chemical industry 
is almost double that in primary metals, despite the fact that the per­
centage price increase in the chemicals sector is only one-half as 
large. The main reason for this is increased use of purchased fuels.
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Table 8. Partial and General Equilibrium Simulations
Endogenous Initial Effect of Removing Electricity Price Differential
Variables Equilibrium (% change from initial equilibrium)
Values (1977) Partial Equilibrium General Equilibrium
(1) (2) (3)
Factor Prices
PK 1.0 -- -0.14
1.0 — -0.42
Intensities
aEP 0.1245 -24.38 -24.40
aFP 0.0365 +0.14 +0.11
aLP 0.2055 -1.95 -1.83
aKP 0.1779 +8.60 +8.51
aEC 0.0263 -56.20 -56.18
aFC 0.0153 +30.43 +30.48
aLC 0.1143 -1.84 -1.68
aKC 0.3552 +1.04 +1.01
aE3C 0.0128 -9.05 -9.36
aFX 0.0060 +5.10 +5.09
aLX 0.2170 -0.14 +0.10
aKX 0.2294 +0.26 +0.15
Primary Factor
Unit Costs:
CP 0.4447 +10.57 +10.12
cc 0.4926 +1.16 +0.96
cx 0.4567 +0.35 +0.09
Output Levels:
P 4.5690 -8.10 -7.92
C 8.4880 -1.11 -0,93
X 74.0010 — -0.02
Electricity
Demand:
E 3.8790 — -10.06
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As a result, unit cost (cc ) increases by only 1.16%, and production 
allocated to the state decreases by slightly more than one percent. I e 
electricity extensive sector's response to rate equalization is similar 
to that for chemicals, only less drastic, since the price of electricity
to X increases by only 27%. As was the case for primary metals, labor 
is complementary with electricity in sectors C and M, causing aLC 
and a1Y to drop. Output in this competitive sector cannot be deter­
mined in the absence of the reminder of the model, but we would expect a
slight drop,
General E quilibrium
As was shown in Section II, by permitting the prices of other fac­
tors (capital and labor) to vary in response to the factor substitution 
in sectors X, P, and G, general equilibrium interactions are initiated. 
Qualitative results developed elsewhere (Hertel, 1983b) indicate that 
there are two effects operating on the economy's wage-rental ratio, when 
a partial factor subsidy on the energy resource input is applied lor 
removed). These are: (1) a "relative substitutability effect , and (2)
a "composition effect". The first arises when capital and labor substi- 
tute differentially for the energy aggregate (i.e», °KR 
But the non-manufacturing sectors are modelled with Cobb-Douglas cost 
functions. Thus, capital and labor are constrained to substitute
equally well for R (cfe* - ^LR “ 1)» sector3 *** b*
temporarily ignored. However, in the manufacturing sectors, capital 
substitutes for energy while labor is a complementary input 
(ovtj > Thus, when the electricity subsidies are removed,
the relative substitutability effect is expected to exert downwar 
pressure on the wage-rental ratio. Labor is released from manufactur­
ing, while capital is absorbed in an effort to conserve more costly
electricity,
The composition effect is driven by differences i n  capital-labor 
ratios in the s u b s i d i z e d  and u n s u b s i d i z e d  sectors. In initial equiLi
rium; KC/LC - 3.11, KX /LX 25 1-06, KP/LP„ " ^ T h i ^ c o m -average capital/labor ratio for all manufacturing of 1.12. This com
pares to an average for the remainder of the economy of 0.80. Thus, it 
can be asserted that the electricity subsidies serve to promote rela­
tively capital intensive sectors. This means that elimination of the 
subsidies will be expected to increase the wage-rental ratio.  ^The price 
of labor relative to capital will be bid up by the expansion of the 
labor intensive, non-manufacturing sectors. The direction m  which 
PT/Py changes, will depend on whether relative substitutability or 
composition effects dominate. Referring to column (3) of Table 8, it 
appears that the former effect is the stronger of the two, as wages drop 
relative to the rental rate on capital.
While the change in PL/PK has been explained, there remains a 
question regarding the movement of these endogenous factor prices rela­
tive to exogenously dictated prices in the model. To address this 
issue, turn to the oligopolistic, locational models for sectors C and P. 
As unit production costs rise, New York's share m  national output 
declines. The same is true for the competitive, tradeable sector X,
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which experiences a drop in exports. This means that pressure on the 
fixed factors of production diminishes and the prices of capital and 
labor are expected to decline, relative to the national price l e v e l .
Lower prices for capital and labor serve to alter the partial equi­
librium intensities, reducing the unit cost of production in every sec­
tor . These general equilibrium outcomes are provided in the third col­
umn of Table 8. Close examination of the differences between partial 
and general equilibrium predictions indicates that the former are a very 
close approximation of the latter. Of course, there are endogenous var­
iables of interest which are only available when the complete model is 
solved. In particular, rate equalization has a substantial effect on 
the use of electricity, with E dropping by 10%.
Under what conditions might the quality of this approximation 
deteriorate? That i s , when might one expect feedback effects on the 
manufacturing sectors to be significant? There are two restrictions on 
the New York State model presented here which serve to limit these gen­
eral equilibrum effects. The first is the assumption of a perfectly 
elastic supply of energy inputs. This serves to insulate the economy 
from changes in p^ resulting from energy conservation, as the electri­
city subsidies are eliminated.
A second restriction which limits the magnitude of the general 
equilibrium interactions is assumption that the prices for manufacturing 
output are fixed exogenously. This is based on the fact that these are 
commodities which are traded in relatively large, national (and interna­
tional) markets. Thus elimination of the factor subsidies does not 
affect the price of output in the subsidized sectors. This serves to 
limit the change in composition of the New York State economy, resulting 
from elimination of the partial factor subsidies on electricity.
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VI. POLICY ANALYSIS
Three departures from the current pattern of electricity subsidies 
are considered. The first two policies examine alternative, equal cost 
subsidies, while the final one considers the implications of eliminating 
the manufacturing subsidies altogether. Before discussing these simula­
tion results, it is important to clarify the opportunity cost concepts 
employed in this section. From a supply perspective, it makes sense to 
use the marginal cost of generating and delivering an additional unit of 
electricity as the base from which departures (subsidies or taxes) are 
measured. Since the model treats capacity in the electric utility sec­
tor as exogenous, the inclination might be to approximate marginal cost 
with the fuel costs required by marginal (oil-fired) generation facili­
ties. However, short-run marginal cost pricing can severely distort the 
utilities1 longer-run, capacity planning. T h u s , many studies have 
focused on the long-run marginal cost of power from a new (e.g., coal- 
fired) plant (Considine, 1981; Smith, 1982) . Unfortunately, estimates 
of this key figure vary widely. In addition, since the model developed 
here treats electricity as a primary factor of production (taking gener­
ating capacity as given) it is somewhat confusing to introduce a long- 
run marginal cost concept.
Instead of using the supply-oriented opportunity cost concept rele­
vant for an intermediate factor of production, a demand-based approach 
will be used. The opportunity cost of the publicly controlled hydro- 
power resource will be defined in terms of the price at which it could 
be sold to the non-subsidized sectors. T h u s , the electricity subsidies 
to sectors P , C , and X are measured as the difference between the price 
actually paid and the price which would have been received for the elec­
tricity had it been sold to the residential and commercial sector. As 
such, the policy analysis focuses on the impact of electricity price 
differentials.
There remains the question of how to adjust these sectoral price 
differences for the differential cost of transmitting and distributing 
electricity to residential and commercial customers on the one hand, and 
manufacturing customers on the other. The differential costs of elec­
tricity transmission and distribution to these two classes of customers 
are reflected in the adjusted electric rates which were provided in 
Table 2. They indicate effective subsidies amounting to 0.8 cents/kwh 
in the case of electricity extensive manufacturing, 2 cents/kwh for the 
chemicals sector and 2.6 cents/kwh in the case of primary metals. The 
total value of electricity subsidies to each of the manufacturing sec­
tors depends on whether observed or equilibrium quantities are used. 
Actual electricity consumption in 1977 , in each of these sectors, dif­
fers somewhat from the equilibrium values predicted by the model (cali­
brated for 1977). The primary metals sector received the largest sub­
sidy in 1977: $226 million ($251 million predicted by the model). This 
is followed by electricity extensive manufacturing, which received $153 
million ($ 126 million predicted by the model) and the chemicals sector 
with $60 million ($74 million in equilibrium). Thus, total manufactur­
ing subsidies in 1977 amounted to $439 million ($451 million predicted 
by the model). In the discussion of alternative subsidy schemes below,
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it is the cost of the electricity subsidy in equilibrium which is alter- 
natively applied to labor costs, and then to production costs.
Equal Cost Labor Subsidies
Perhaps the most striking feature of the PASNY proposal for reallo­
cation of hydropower, which was mentioned in the introduction, is the 
fact that it leaves untouched almost 60% of the current allocations —  
namely that hydropower going to industry. The reasoning behind this 
feature of the proposal is concisely stated in the Chairman's executive 
summary:
Upstate New York would benefit [from the proposal] by retain­
ing cheap power so critical to maintaining an estimated 
100,000 jobs. The price that industry pays for this Authority 
power would remain the lowest in the United States. Also, the 
expansion power which is not protected by statute or contract 
would be retained for industrial use at similarly favorable 
rates [Dyson (1981), p. ii].
Given the overwhelming interest in keeping jobs in the state, it is 
interesting to consider whether or not there are alternative, more 
effective means of promoting employment. Common sense suggests that the 
best way to encourage the hiring of additional labor is to lower the 
effective wage rate facing firms.20 In the context of the problem at 
hand, this intervention is modelled as a set of labor subsidies which 
are equal in cost to the existing electricity subsidies for each sector. 
Thus, instead of receiving $251 million in electricity rate reductions, 
the primary metals sector experiences a reduction in unit labor costs 
which (in the new equilibrium) has a total value of $251 million. The 
same policy is used for sectors X and C which receive reductions of $126 
million and $74 million, respectively. This means that, under the labor 
subsidy scenario, all sectors are forced to pay the same price for elec­
tricity, net of transmission and distribution cost differentials.
In order to solve the model, with the equal cost subsidies in 
place, it is necessary to fix the price of labor exogenously. This 
provides an upper bound on the absolute change in state employment. It 
is also consistent with the assumption that the supply of labor is per­
fectly elastic (for small changes in demand such as those resulting 
here). The latter assumption may be justified if there exists a suffi­
cient pool of unemployed (or underemployed) residents of the state, or 
if there is substantial interstate mobility of the labor force. Non­
employment related data are not reported in Table 9 for the labor sub­
sidy scenario because they are not strictly comparable to the other pol­
icy interventions as a result of fixing the wage rate exogenously.
Replacing the electricity subsidy with a labor subsidy reduces the 
wage rates facing sectors P, C, and X by 24%, 7%, and 1%, respectively.
20This result is formally supported by theoretical work on the problem 
of optimal intervention (Bhagwatti, 1971).
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Table 9. Impact of Alternative Policies (% change from initial equilibriums 
1977)
Target Variables Equal-Cost Subsidies No Subsidies
Labor Subsidy 
(fixing P^)**
Production Subsidy
Sectoral Output
P — +1.38% -7.92%
G — +0.49% -0.93%
Employment (upper 
bound - fixing P^)
L +0.35% -0.47% -0.74%
(change in jobs)* (+24,600) (-20,400) (-51,000)
Relative Factor 
Returns
p /P1/ K
-0.36% -0.28%
Real Income
Y -- -0.05% +0.16%
(change in mill. $) 
Electricity
-- (-71) (+223)
Demand
E — -9.00% -10.06%
* Change in Sectoral 
Employment
Primary metals + 8,500 500 - 8,600
Chemicals + 3,400 - 1,100 - 2,600
Other manufacturing - 3,600 - 7,000 -13,600
Wholesale/retail +12,600 - 9,100 —18,100 - 900Ag. and mining 0 0
Other + 3,700 - 2,700 - 7,200
+24,600 -20,400 -51,000
** Non-employment values are not strictly comparable.
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In the new equilibrium, which results in a 0.35% increase in state 
employment (Table 9), translates21 2 into approximately 24,600 additional 
jobs. Most of this increase comes in primary metals (8,500 jobs) and 
the wholesale/retail sector (12,600 jobs). Employment in the former 
increases due to an increase in the intensity with which labor is 
employed (output actually drops). This is the result of the labor sub­
sidy in that sector. Employment in the wholesale/retail sector 
increases as a result of increased output at an unchanged labor inten­
sity. Employment in the chemicals sector increases by 3,400 jobs for 
the same reason as primary m e tals, while employment in sector X actually 
drops by 3,600. The latter occurs, despite the subsidy on labor, 
because the drop in output outweighs the marginal increase in the labor 
intensity of electricity extensive manufacturing.
Equal Cost Production Subsidies
Next, consider the effect of replacing each sector’s electricity 
subsidy with a production subsidy of equal cost. Using the initial 
equilibrium (with electricity subsidies in place) as a baseline, the 
second column of Table 9 captures the effect of the production subsidy 
scenario on various target variables. Output in both oligopolistic sec­
tors increases, but real22 income drops. In evaluating this outcome, it 
is useful to draw on Miezkowski's (1966) results which are derived in 
the context of a perfectly competitive 2 x 2  model.23 He demonstrated 
that, while production subsidies dominate factor subsidies as a mechan­
ism for achieving a given level of output, if equal cost subsidies are 
applied, the production subsidy will create more excess burden. Thus, 
the additional output in P and C is expected to come only at the price 
of a loss in real income.
Since this empirical model departs from Miezkowski’s perfectly com­
petitive case, there are some additional factors associated with the 
observed change in real income. The submodels describing behavior of 
the national, oligopolistic chemical and primary metals sectors intro­
duce the possibility of profits and losses. Since the price of output 
in these sectors is fixed exogenously (determined nationally), and is 
not linked to state production costs via zero profit conditions, any 
decline in the unit cost of production serves to enhance profits (which 
are transferred out of the state). In addition, the production subsidy 
operates directly on the firm's unit cost of production, whereas the
21Xhe 0.35% increase in L is equal to a $268 million rise in payments to 
labor. At the (1977) average wage for production workers in New York 
manufacturing ($10,874), this translates into 24,646 jobs.
22Nominal income was deflated by both the Laspeyres and Paasche cost of 
living indices. These represent upper and lower b o unds, respectively, 
on the true deflator. They were virtually identical for all of the 
policy intervent ions discussed in this chapter.
23See Hertel (1983a) for further elaboration on the application of 
Miezskowski1s analysis.
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effect of the electricity subsidy on unit costs is dampened somewhat by 
factor substitution. Thus, when electricity subsidies are replaced by 
production subsidies, unit production costs drop, and profits in sectors 
P and C increase by $32.5 million and $21.0 million, respectively. Since 
the model assumes that supernormal profits (or losses) are absorbed by 
the sector's national owners, these excess profits represent a loss to 
the state of $53,5 million.
There are two additional factors, both of which serve to dampen the 
drop in real income. The first is the reallocation of output in the two 
oligopolistic sectors. In the production subsidy scenario, out put in 
both P and C increases, bringing additional economic activity and income 
to the state. Operating in the same direction are the savings associ~ 
ated with reduced petroleum imports. With electricity demand dropping 
by 9%, the demand for imported oil to generate marginal electricity sup“ 
plies drops substantially. Combined, these four factors increased 
excess burden, oligopolistic profits, increased output in C and P> and 
reduced oil imports — * result in a $71 million drop in real state income.
Due to the complementary relationship between labor and energy m  
manufacturing, the increased electricity prices paid by the manufacturing 
sector serve to dampen the demand for labor. With fixed, this 
results in the loss of 20,400 jobs. When the price of labor is permitted 
to vary (labor supply is fixed), the effect on the wage “rental ratio 
depends on the size and direction of relative substitutability and comp©” 
sitIon effects. Because capital substitutes for energy, while labor and 
energy are complementary inputs, the former serves to dampen the wage~ 
rental ratio as the price of electricity to manufacturing rises The 
composition effect is driven by differing capital“labor intensities in 
the subsidized and unsubsidized sectors. The subsidized (manufacturing) 
sectors are relatively capital intensive so that an increase in their 
share of state output also serves to bid the wage-rental ratio down as 
well. The anticipated drop in this ratio is shown in Table 9.
No Subsidies
The final policy scenario involves elimination of the partial fac­
tor subsidy, with the proceeds being transferred, in a lump s u m , to the 
state’s consumers. (This was the shock utilized in the previous section 
to examine partial and general equilibrium interactions.) The drop in 
sector P's output is substantial (7.9%) due to the difficulty of substi­
tuting away from electricity in primary metals production. Equally 
interesting is the minimal dec1ine in sector C 1 s output because of its 
ability to substitute purchased fuels for electricity. The chemical 
sector in the state does not appear to be as sensitive to electricity 
prices as might otherwise be believed.
Analysis of the change in real state income is once again compli­
cated by the non-competitive features of the m o d e l . In a fully neoclass­
ical model, elimination of the subsidies to manufacturing would be accom­
panied by increased real income, attributable to more e f fic tent utilize 
tion of the state’s resources. However, the reallocation of economic
activity in sectors P and C away from New York contributes to a lowering
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of state income. Operating in the opposite direction is the transfer of 
capital into the state to cover the economic losses sustained in these 
two sectors due to the divergence of unit production costs from exogen­
ous output prices. These transfers are large, amounting to $187 million 
in the case of primary metals and $36 million for the chemicals sector. 
Finally, there is an income gain resulting from electricity conservation 
(a 10% drop in E) with the associated reduction in oil imports. The net 
effect of these varied forces is a $223 million increase in real state 
income.
Once again the complementary relationship between labor and elec­
tricity is expected to lead to a drop in state employment when the elec­
tricity subsidies are eliminated. Fixing the price of labor and resolv­
ing the model under the same no subsidy policy leads to a $555 million 
drop in expenditures for labor. This translates into a loss of approxi­
mately 51,000 jobs. However, only one-half of these jobs (24,800) are 
lost in the manufacturing sectors. The others are eliminated in the 
remainder of the economy, where labor intensities also drop. But these 
sectors face unchanging prices for electricity, purchased fuels, and (in 
this case) labor. Thus it is the drop in the equilibrium price of capi­
tal that encourages substitution away from the labor input.
Comparison with Other Models
The conclusion that employment drops when the electricity subsidies 
are eliminated (and the proceeds transferred in a lump-sum to consum­
ers) , differs sharply from the results of other models of the New York 
State economy. The model developed by Smith (forthcoming) is important 
because of the degree of disaggregation achieved (22 sectors). This 
enables treatment of (e.g.) the aluminum industry as a distinct sector. 
The costs of this disaggregation include: exogenous factor prices, 
endogenous commodity prices, and most significantly, the use of one of 
the two restrictive functional forms consistent with coefficients in an 
1-0 table (Cobb-Douglas or fixed coefficient production functions). 
Thus, labor and electricity are constrained to be either substitutes in 
production, or to be employed in fixed proportions. This eliminates the 
possibility of complementarity. In addition, there is no counterpart to 
the oligopolistic, locational models. However, Smith's model does per­
mit output changes in response to shifts in the pattern of final demand. 
At this level of disaggregation, he finds that marginal increases in 
income, when transferred to consumers, are spent disporportionately more 
on relatively labor intensive commodities. This serves to increase 
employment in the case with fixed coefficient production functions.
Another recent study of electricity pricing in New York State 
(Considine, 1981) utilizes ah aggregate, Keynsian framework. As in the 
research reported here, Considine found labor and electricity to be com­
plements in production in the aggregate, manufacturing sector. However, 
when he simulated an increase in the price of electricity paid by the 
manufacturing sector, this complementary relationship was dwarfed by an 
increase in employment in the commercial sector. The reason for this 
increase may be traced back to the Keynsian multiplier implicit in his 
macroeconomic model of the state's economy. This begins with reduced
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electricity consumption leading to a drop in oil imports. Assuming that 
the majority of these savings remains in the state, they carry with them 
a multiplier effect. This multiplier increases state income substan­
tially. A large part of this additional income is spent in the commer­
cial sector, which in turn generates employment in excess of the losses 
sustained in manufacturing.
This Reynsian multiplier is no different from the intraregional 
multiplier employed in regional economics. While it can be criticized 
on grounds of aggregation, it does point to an important feature of the 
economic environment facing state policy makers (Isard, 1982) . The 
problematic feature of these multiplier effects, in the context of elec­
tricity pricing policy, is that the resulting increases in real income 
and employment are not inherently linked to "efficient" pricing. 
Rather, they follow from any increase in the price charged for an 
imported item, or a product that has a substantial imported component 
(e.g., oil-generated electricity). It is thus conceivable, in such a 
model, that inefficient taxation of electricity consumption, designed to 
drive the price far above marginal cost, would lead to further increases 
in real state income.
In contrast to Keynsian models, the general equilibrium model 
employed in this paper determines net exports as a residual, No dis­
tinction is made between imported and domestic products in specifying 
demand relationships. The state simply imports that amount which is 
required to meet domestic demands, based on current income. Further­
more, since the price of tradeable goods is fixed exogenously, a tax on 
imports will always (in a first-best world) lead to a drop in real 
income, because the state is driving a wedge between the actual and per­
ceived opportunity costs of the imported product.
There are, however, two important economic effects of electricity 
rate reform which the general equilibrium model presented here neglects. 
First, the aggregate Cobb-Douglas structure of final demand which is 
employed does not allow for changes in output mix stimulated by widely 
varying income elasticities of demand across sectors, Secondly, the 
absence of a Keynsian consumption function in the model means that the 
multiplier effects, commonly employed in regional models, are absent, 
Empirical evidence indicates that both of these effects serve to 
increase employment when electricity subsidies are removed (and the 
proceeds transferred to consumers). In addition, the employment effects 
in the general equilibrium model were derived under the' assumption of a 
fixed price of labor. For all of these reasons, the estimated drop in 
employment in the no-subsidy scenario should be viewed with caution, and 
interpreted as a bound on the likely outcome. Losses in employment will 
probably be smaller than the levels predicted by this general equilib­
rium model.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a model for analyzing the implications of alterna­
tive allocations of the economic rents emanating from New York State's 
hydropower was developed. Given the emphasis which state policymakers 
place on employment, one measure of the relative merit of alternative 
allocation schemes might be the number of jobs created. In this case, 
policy simulations in Section V indicate that the state would be better 
off selling hydropower to manufacturing at the residential and commer­
cial rate (net of the transmission and. distribution cost differential), 
if each manufacturing sector is provided with an equal cost labor sub­
sidy instead. This has the added benefit of promoting energy conserva­
tion , due to the more efficient pricing of electricity.
How might such a labor subsidy be implemented? One possibility 
would be to institute a non-linear price schedule for electricity. 
While marginal rates could be tied to the opportunity cost of electri­
city, inframarginal costs could be tied to the firms’ level of employ­
ment . That is, the labor subsidy would be provided as a reduction in 
the firm* s electricity bill. In contrast, the model indicates that the 
direct effect of eliminating electricity subsidies to the manufacturing 
sector providing the proceeds to households, would be to decrease 
employment. The total employment effect will depend on the size of the 
composition and multiplier effects, which are not completely captured in 
this m o d e l .
Another concern of state policymakers involves the effect of the 
subsidies on the overall level of economic activity and income. Much of 
the economic activity in the neighborhood of the Niagara Falls and 
Massena hydropower facilities can be linked to the availability of 
cheap, reliable electricity. It was shown that replacement of electri­
city subsidies with equal cost production subsidies will stimulate out­
put in these electricity intensive sectors. Howe v e r , this increased 
output comes only at the cost of a loss in overall state income. A lump 
sum transfer of the hydropower rents to consumers remains the most 
effective means of increasing state income.
The locational models for chemicals and primary metals serve to 
highlight the important role played by production costs in different 
states, specifically electricity prices. For example, while electricity 
rates for aluminum companies in the Northwestern U . S . are increasing, 
PASNY has renewed long-term contracts with aluminum companies in New 
York State at very low prices. If these low prices were applied to 
marginal output only, it is conceivable that they might serve to encour­
age increased production in the state. Otherwise the subsidy in these 
contracts will simply be translated into increased profits for this 
oligopolistic sector, and perhaps lower prices for aluminum. Unfortu­
nately, the cheap hydropower is in fixed supply, and alternatives to 
existing manufacturing allocations would probably provide more effective 
ways to stimulate economic growth.
Another conclusion is that the cheap hydropower currently provided 
to the chemical sector apparently does little to affect the level of 
national output allocated to New York State. When this subsidy is
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removed it is apparent that there are ready substitutes, particularly in 
the form of primary fuels, which serve to prevent any marked change in 
the unit cost of production. Combined, these conelusions indicate that 
it may well make sense for PASNY to monitor production, costs in the rest 
of the country more closely, adjusting electricity prices in New York 
accordingly.
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